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OPPORTUNITY FUND, LLC, JAMES
FREEMAN,and RICKBY B. NOVAK,
Counterclaim-Defendants.
 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Courtis Plaintiffs’ Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment, filed October22,
2019 (“Motion”).! Having reviewed the recordand considered the arguments of counsel during
a hearing on October19, 2020, the Courtenters the following order.
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 In Fulton County v. Ward-Poag, 2020 WL 5883344, at *3 (Ga. October 5, 2020), the
Georgia Supreme Courtrecently reiterated the “well-establishedprinciples” guidinga trial court’s
review of a motion for summary judgment. “A trial court can grant summaryjudgmentto a moving
party only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the undisputed evidence warrants
judgment as a matterof law. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). In reviewing the evidence, a court must
construeall facts and draw all inferencesin favorof the non-movant.” Ward-Poagexpressly relied
on Messex _v. Lynch, 255 Ga. 208, 210 (1985) that further provides, “[t]he party opposing the
motionis to be giventhe benefit ofall reasonable doubts in determining whethera genuine issue
exists, and the trial court must give that party the benefit ofall favorable inferences that may be
drawnfrom the evidence.”
2. FINDINGS OF FACT
Ronald Reeser long held a desire to develop 2,718 acres of land located in Santa Rosa
County, Florida (the “Property”). He previously owned the Property with a former partner and
spent millions of dollars laying the groundworkforthe site to be developed, including efforts at
land planning,re-zoning, infrastructure development, and endangered species mitigation. (Reeser
Aff., filed Dec. 14, 2016, { 3.) These development plans failed, and the Property ultimately
* Consideration of this Motion wasstayed for several months by the agreementof counsel so they could fully explore
an amicable resolution of this dispute. (Consent OrderStaying Case, entered January 4, 2020; Consent Order Setting
Deadlines and Hearing, entered August 19, 2020.) Duringthis time, case deadlines were also stayed as a result of
emergencyjudicial orders entered by the Georgia Supreme Courtin light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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becamepart of a bankruptcy estate, controlled by a bankruptcy receiver whoplacedit forsale.
(Reeser Dep., pp. 31, 35-36.) The Property was subject to a 2013 consent order between a prior
interest holder and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection requiring wetlands
remediation. (Id., pp. 95-96; PI. Ex. 31.) The Property’s sale was conditioned uponthe buyer
 agreeing to perform the required remediation, estimated to cost $832,000, in addition to the
purchaseprice. (Id., pp. 53-54, 96-97.)
On December14, 2014, Natural Resource Management, LP (*“NRM”), an entity owned by
Reeser, Mason Drake, and non-partyPatrick Maher, contracted to purchase the Property for $3.9
million, depositing $150,000 in earnest money. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SUMF, Ans. No. 1; Pl. Ex. 21.)
However, because NRM andits principals lacked the funds necessary to close on the sale or
perform the required remediation, investors were needed, and theinitial closing deadline of
February 17, 2015 madethe search for such investors time-sensitive. (Reeser Dep., pp. 55-56; 78-
79; Sikes Dep., pp. 30-31.)
Through a mutual acquaintance, non-party Clay Sikes, Drake set up a meeting where he,
Reeser and Kenneth Minchew, who was also working to develop the Property, met with Atlanta-
based investors James W. Freeman and Ricky B. Novak. (Drake Dep., pp. 31-32, 42-43; Reeser
Dep., pp. 56-57.) As generally described by Defendants,this group agreed ona plan“to develop
part of the Property, andto sell conservation easements in the remainder, which would monetize
the valuable tax breaks to individuals who subscribed.” (Def. Am. Resp. to PI. MSJ, p. 4.)
“Jubilee” was the shorthand nameforthe project, and the framework of the deal involved
numerousentities. The Property would be owned byJubilee Investment Holdings, LLC (“JIH”),
and Jubilee Manager, LLC (“JM”) would manage JIH andlead efforts to develop the Property.’
2 The JIH Operating Agreementwill be cited as the JIH Agreement. (PI. SUMF, Ex. 5.) The JM Operating
Agreement will be cited as the JM Agreement(PI. SUMF,Ex.3.)
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The deal participants created or used otherentities in which theyhadaninterest to help facilitate
the deal: Strategic Jubilee Holdings, LLC (“Strategic”) was anentity affiliated with the Atlanta
investors Freeman and Novak; River Life Investments, LLC (“RiverLife”) was an entity affiliated
with Sikes; Jubilee Development Partners, LLC (“Jubilee Development”) was an entity formed
 by Reeser and Drake, and Minchew Enterprises, LLC (“Minchew Enterprises”) was a pre-existing
entity owned by Minchewand his family members.? (Drake Dep., p. 51; Reeser Dep., p. 118;
MinchewDep., pp. 30-32.)
JIH would have three initial members in two ownership classes. Class A units in JIH were
held by Strategic and anotherentity affiliated with Freeman and Novak, Strategic Real Estate
Opportunity Fund, LLC (“SREOF”). (JIH Agreement, § 7.1, Ex. B.) JM was to make a capital
contribution of $375,000 andreceive 15 Class B units in JTH.* (Id., § 7.2, Ex. B.) JM would have
four members: Strategic, River Life, Jubilee Development, and Minchew Enterprises. (Def. Resp.
to Plaintiff's SUMF, Ans. No. 6.) Three would make a $75,000 initial capital contribution and
each receive a 20% ownership interest in JM except Jubilee Development would make a
contribution of $150,000 and receive a 40% ownershipinterest. (Id., Ans. No 7; JIH Agreement,
§ 7.2.) The $375,000 total amountofinitial capital contributions to be made by JM’s members
was the same amount JM would makein a capital contribution to JIH.
OnFebruary 11, 2015, while the structures of JIH and JM werestill being negotiated, NRM
assignedits right to purchase the Property to JIH for a $300,000 fee plus replacement of NRM’s
$150,000 in earnest money. (Def. Resp. to Pl. SUMF, Ans. No 2.) This $300,000 fee was separate
* Jubilee Dev. Partners, LLC v. Strategic Jubilee Holdings. LLC, 344 Ga. App. 204,n. 2-4 (2018) cert. denied Aug.
2, 2018.
‘In connection with a $25,000 loan madebyStrategic,it also held | Class B unit. (JIH Operating Agreement, {J
5.5.3 and 7.1.)
from the $3.9 million purchaseprice for the Property. (Id., Ans. No. 3; Pl. SUMF Ex. 27.) The
February 2015 closing was ultimately delayed, andthe parties continued to negotiate questions
involving the creation andstructure of JIH and JM until thefinal closing date, March 31, 2015.
(Reeser Dep., pp. 116; 130.)
 The deal participants discussed how initial capital contributions to JM would be made and
then, in turn, would be used to fund JM’s initial capital contribution to JIH. Strategic and River
Life plannedto pay their capital contributions immediately, so these discussions focused on the
$225,000 collectively due from Jubilee Developmentand MinchewEnterprises. (Id., Ans. No. 8.)
Initially, Freeman and Novakanticipated the capital contributions of these two entities would be
fundedfrom disbursements made whenthe Property closed, particularly the $300,000 assignment
fee NRW wasto receive. (Freeman Dep., pp. 84, 146; Novak Dep., p. 54.) However, as the
closing approached it became apparent the plan to use closing disbursements might not prove
feasible as muchofthis $300,000 fee owed to NRM waspledgedto pay other debts. (Novak Dep.,
p. 54-55; Reeser Dep., p. 126; Minchew Dep., pp. 64-66.) The deal participants reached some
agreement that these obligations would initially remain unfunded, but they had no shared
understanding how or whenthe contributions would be made.
On March 23, 2015, one week before the closing, Novak sent Defendants a lengthy email
addressing the financial aspects of the deal with draft documentation regarding the creation of JIH
and JM (the “March 23" Email”). (Novak Dep., p. 82; Pl.’s SUMF, Ex. 15.) It outlined various
fees and commissions that were anticipated to be paid as a result ofthe deal. It addressed the
$300,000 that NRM would receiveat closing,stating the money should be usedto fundtheinitial
capital contributions payable to JM from Jubilee Development and MinchewEnterprises.
However, Novak stated these contributions could “be deferred until a later point in 2015 if
absolutely necessary.” The March 23" Email concluded,
[als we previously discussed, we want [JM] to be properly funded based on everyone’s
equity interest so we expect everyoneto truly fund $75,000 each . . . these amounts would
need to be paid prior to the end of 2015 atthe latest, and preferably be paid from the fees
[anticipated to be disbursedat the closing]. . . Underthis structure, weare all on equal
footing fromaninitial capital contribution perspective. [JM] will have 15 Class B units
and each $75,000 memberof[JM]essentially / indirectly has 3 Class B units in [JIH].
Novak, Freeman, and Sikes all recount these two entities agreed to pay their capital
contributions in cash by the end of 2015. (Freeman Dep. p. 89; Novak Dep., p. 87; Sikes Dep.,
pp. 182, 185-186; 195.) However, Reeser, Drake, and Minchewdispute there was any specific
agreement these entities would be required to make a cash contributionat all. Drake and Minchew
assert an agreement was reached that the capital contributions required of Jubilee Development
and MinchewEnterprises would be offset fromanticipated future streams of income generated by
the Property such as real estate commissions, revenues from conservation easements or JM’s
distributions to its members from management and developmentfees received from JIH. (Drake
Dep. pp. 61-63; 86-88; Minchew Dep., pp. 70-74; 76-77; 187-188.) Reeser asserts there was
never any intent for Jubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises to pay their capital
contributions. (Reeser Dep., pp. 133-141.) Rather, he claimed these two entities satisfied their
capital contribution requirement simply by bringing the opportunity regarding the Property to JIH.
He further claimed once the conservation easements, which he deemed to be quite lucrative,
produced enough revenue so that Strategic and River Life were able to recoup their capital
contributions, the obligation of Jubilee Development and MinchewEnterprises to paytheirinitial
capital contributions would be forgiven, and all members would be placed on equal footing. (Id.,
pp. 133-139; 141.) He viewed the plan for the capital contribution to besatisfied through future
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offsets as a “back up plan” should the anticipated revenue fromthe conservation easementsfail to
materialize. (Id., pp. 122-125.)
Although both the JIH Agreement and JM Agreement were executed either late on March
30, 2015 or early the next day before the sale ofthe Property closed, they both contain effective
 dates of March 10, 2015. (Freeman Dep.pp. 116; 142; Novak Dep., pp. 123-124; JIH Agreement,
p. 1; JM Agreement, p. 1.) The JIH Agreementstated Strategic and SREOF each “has made (or
will make)” their required capital contributions. (JIH Agreement, § 7.1.) It further stated JM “has
made”its required capital contribution. (Id., §7.2.) The JM Agreement reflectedthatthe initial
capital contributionsofJubilee Development and MinchewEnterprises, respectively $150,000 and
$75,000, had yet to be funded but made no mention of how or when the funding should occur.
(JM Operating Agreement, § 7.1; Sched. A.) The JM Agreementfurther contained a merger
clause. (JM Agreement, § 14.21.)
As reflected above, while the two companies were created at the same time and their
operating agreements were contemporaneous,the JM Agreement unequivocally stated it had yet
to receive the full $375,000 in capital contributions from its members while the JIH Operating
Agreementindicated that JM had paid its full $375,000 capital contribution. (JIH Operating
Agreement, § 7.2.) Freemanclaimsthis was a scrivener’s errorin the JIH Agreement, discovered
only after this litigation commenced. (Freeman Dep., pp. 340; 343-44.) However, this
representation that JM had paid JIH the full amount of $375,000 it owed in capital contributions
subsequently made its way into various other documents involving the project, including tax
returns and solicitations to outside investors. (Sikes Dep. pp. 160-161; 165; Freeman Dep., pp.
148-149; 155-157; 271-272; 276-277; Novak Dep., pp. 142; 144 146.)
After JIH acquired the Property, JM, acting through Jubilee Development, began
developmentefforts — overseeing and completing the required wetlands remediation, working on
a market study, and selecting a land planner. (Reeser Aff., filed December 14, 2016, §§ 13-18.)
JM was to be accorded a management fee fromJIH forits efforts. (Freeman Dep., pp. 220-221;
 313-315.)
On October 8, 2015, Freeman sent an email to Reeser, Novak, and Minchew reminding
them ofthe capital contributions owed by Jubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises which
“youall agreed to fund before year-end.” (Emphasis in original.) (Sikes Dep., p. 195; Pl. SUMF,
Ex. 38.) Reeser sent an emailreply, “I prefer to wire . . .” (Pl. SUMF; Ex. 38.)
The dispute betweenthe deal’s participants regarding the nature ofand due date forthe
unpaid capital contributions came to a head in an email exchange at the end of 2015 (“December
2015 Email Chain”). (Pl. SUMF,Ex. 7.) It began on December28, 2015 when Freemanrequested
the entities to wire their contributions before December31, 2015. (Id., p. SJH000363.) Minchew
replied requesting Freeman resend himthe wiring instructions. (Id.; Minchew Dep.pp. 77-78.)
On December 28, 2015, Freeman provided the requested wiring instructions and asked Resser,
Drake, and Minchew to send confirmation when they wired their funds. (SUMF, Ex. 7, p.
SJH000362.) However, no funds were received.
Onthe evening of December30, 2015, Freemancontinued with the December 2015 email
chain, sending an urgent request to Reeser, Drake, and Minchew,stating the funds neededto be
wired the next day. (Id. at p. SJHO00361.) Having received no funds, he sent another urgent
request early onthe afternoon of December31, 2015. (Id.) Drake replied late in the afternoon,
stating the demand fora capital contribution before year end wascontraryto the deal originally
negotiated. (Id.) No contributions were received from Jubilee Development or Minchew
Enterprises.
OnJanuary 26, 2016, Strategic wrote a letter to JMalleging it was in “material breach” of
the JIH Agreementbecauseit still owed $225,000 ofits required capital contributions. (PI. Ex.
 10.) On February 24, 2016, Reeser responded,outlining his understanding that JM had satisfied
the requirement to JIH providing $150,000.00 in cash and a note from JM forthe remaining
$225,000, and he suggested if the documentation was needed, Strategic should prepare it. (Def.
Ex. F.) On February 26, 2016, Strategic unilaterally removed JM as managerof JIH based upon
the failure to fund fully its required capital contribution. (Freeman Dep., p. 220.)
After JM was removed from JIH, Freeman and Novak determined they no longer wished
to develop the Property and decidedto donatea large portionofit to the State of Florida. (Reeser
Aff., filed Dec. 14, 2016, § 28.) In aneffort to prevent this donation, on November1, 2016,
Defendants sued Strategic, JIH, River Life and others in Florida, seeking damagesandinjunctive
relief for the alleged wrongful removal of JM as managing memberof JIH. (ReeserAff., filed
Dec. 14, 2016, 4 30.) Subsequently, the Florida case was voluntarily dismissed.
Asdetailed below,Strategic and JMfiledthe instant suit. In the midst of thislitigation,
Strategic amended JM’s 2015 tax returns informing revenue authorities the company’s, “assets
and contributions were overstated because two would-be partners failed to make their
contributions and therefore, neversatisfied the conditions for partnership.” (Freeman Dep., pp.
291-292; 298-300; Def. Ex. G.) These amendedreturns reflect Strategic and River Life as the only
members of JM. (Id.)
3. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The instant lawsuit commenced in December of 2016. Strategic and JM filed the above-
styled Complaint against Jubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises as well as their
principals, Reeser, Minchew, and Drake, asserting three counts that deal solely with the
 
management of JM. RiverLife is not named as a party, but it agreed Strategic wouldfairly and
adequately representits interests in the case. (Verified Complaint, J 37 -38, Ex. 3.) Count I seeks
a declaratory judgment that Jubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises are not members of
JM because theyfailed to pay their requiredinitial capital contributions. Alternatively, Plaintiffs
raise two other claims. CountII is a breach of contract claim against the twoentities forfailing to
make their initial capital contributions under the JM Agreement, and CountIII is a breach of
fiduciary duty claim against the individual Defendants Reeser, Drake, and Minchew, the managers
appointed by Jubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises, forfailing to cause these entities to
pay theirinitial capital contributions. Plaintiffs also seek their expensesoflitigation pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11.
Defendants initially asserted 13 counterclaims and added Novak, Freeman, JIH and
SREOFas Counterclaim Defendants. (Def. Am. Ver. Ans. and Counterclaims, § 12.)> Three
counterclaims involving JIH, Count | (breach of the JIH Agreement to pay development fees),
Count II (breach of JIH Agreement to pay JM management fees), and Count VIII (breach of
fiduciary duty against Strategic in relation to JIH and its memberJM) are nowbeingarbitrated as
required by the arbitration clause ofthe JIH Agreement. (JIH Agreement, § 15.16.)
* Defendantsfirst answered and movedto dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute. (Mot.
to Dismiss,filed Dec. 15, 2016.) The Court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motionto dismiss wasaffirmed on appeal.
Jubilee Dev. Partners. Following the appellate remand, Defendants asserted their counterclaims.
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In the present Motion, Plaintiffs seek summaryjudgment ontheir claims for declaratory
judgment and breach ofcontract. They also seek summary judgmentfor counterclaims including:
CountIII (fraudin the inducement), Count IV (negligent misrepresentation), Count V (conspiracy
to commit fraud), and Count VI (promissory estoppel).
 
4. ANALYSIS
A, Plaintiffs’ Claim for Declaratory Judgment
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Jubilee Development and MinchewEnterprises
are not members of JM. (Plaintiffs’ Motion, p. 8.) The Court agrees with DefendantsthatPlaintiff
have failed to set forth a properclaimfor declaratory relief because Plaintiffs face no uncertainty
with regard to a future action that a declaratory judgment was intendedto address.
It is a settled principle of Georgia law that the jurisdiction of the courts is confined to
justiciable controversies, and the courts may not properly render advisory opinions.
Declaratoryrelief therefore is inappropriate for controversies that are merely hypothetical,
abstract, academic or moot, and a declaratory judgment will not be rendered based on a
possible or probable future contingency because such a ruling would be an erroneous
advisory opinion.
Strong v.JWMHoldings, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 309, 314 (2017) (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Without guidance from the Court, Strategic, purportedly acting as the manager of JM, amended
JM’s 2015 tax returns with the unequivocal statement that Jubilee Development and Minchew
Enterprises were not members of JM because they failed to make their required capital
contributions. Consequently, the declaratory judgment Plaintiffs now seek would simply be an
advisory opinion regarding the propriety ofa position they have already acted upon, rather than
providing Plaintiffs with guidance against the uncertaintyof their future conduct.
B. Plaintiffs’ Claim for Breach ofContract
Alternatively, Plaintiffs arguethe failure ofJubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises
to pay their initial capital contributions is a breach of the JM Agreement. The record reveals the
members ofJM had differing ideas aboutthe nature of and deadline for makingtheirinitial capital
 
contributions, and Defendants present the Court with a virtual mountain of parol evidence
regarding the intent of the parties. However, the key question the Court must first address is
whetherit may even consider evidence outside the four corners of the JM Agreement. “[U]nless
an ambiguity exists, the court may not look outside the terms of the contract to consider
surrounding circumstances or parol evidence. Indeed, whenthe languageofthe contractis clear
and unambiguous,it will be enforced accordingto its plain terms, and the contract alone is looked
to for meaning (emphasisin original.)” Yash Sols., LLC v. New York Glob. Consultants Corp.,
352 Ga. App. 127, 141 (2019) (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Section 7.1 of the JM Agreementprovides:
The initial Capital Contributions of the Members are set forth on Schedule A attached
hereto, however, certain Membershave not yet funded their capital contributions to [JM]
as of the Effective Date and, therefore, such amounts are deemed to be due from such
Memberas shown on Schedule A. (Emphasis supplied.)
Schedule A specifies the amount each member owed and which member’scapital contributions
had not already been paid. (JM Agreement, Schedule A.) Anasterisk placed nextto the required
contributions of Jubilee Development and MinchewEnterprises lead to a note indicating it was
the “amount due” to JM from these two membersastheirinitial capital contributions have “not
yet been made...” (Id.)
The Court finds the use of the word “due” in the JM Agreement creates an ambiguity
because of its various connotations. The word “due” is commonly used to reflect amounts
immediately owed or, alternatively, it is often used to indicate amounts that are owed but are
payable in the future. The ambiguity regarding the initial capital contributionsis furtherreflected
in a glaring inconsistency between the JIH Agreement and the JM Agreement, two
contemporaneous contracts simultaneously creating two entities, both involved in the same
 transaction. See Lovell v. Thomas, 279 Ga. App. 696, 700 (2006) (“[w]hen an agreementconsists
of multiple documents that are executed at the same time and during the course of a single
transaction, those documents should be read together.”) These two contracts reflect the $375,000
in initial capital contributions owed to and owed by JM quite differently. One indicates JM has
yet to receive the full $375,000 initially owed fromits members,yet the otherreflects that JM has
paid the full amountit initially owed to JIH. Thus, the Court finds an uncertainty regarding just
howand when Jubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises were to pay theirinitial capital
contributions to JM. Inorder to resolve the ambiguity, the Court must “apply the rules of contract
construction” and under these rules “parol evidence is admissible to explain an ambiguity in a
written contract, although such evidence is inadmissible to add to, take from, or vary the writing
itself.” Atlanta Dev. Auth. v. Ansley Walk Condo. Assn., 350 Ga. App 584, 588 (2019). Here,
the considerable parol evidence does not resolve the ambiguity. Indeed, the parol evidence
indicates questions offact exist among the deal’s participants regarding howand whenthe unpaid
contributions should be made thusprecluding the entry of summary judgmentonPlaintiffs’ breach
of contract claim.
C. Counterclaims
Counterclaimants assert that Novak, Freeman, Strategic, and SREOF(collectively the
“Strategic Parties”) either intentionally or negligently misrepresented that the initial capital
contributions payable by Jubilee Development and MinchewEnterprises could remain unfunded
until JM made a disbursementof fees orprofits earned through the acquisition or developmentof
the Property. (Amended Answer and Counterclaims, § 82.) As a result of these
misrepresentations, Counterclaimants assert they were inducedto(i) enter into the JM Agreement
 and JIH Agreement,(i1) assign their rights to acquire the Property to JIH and(iii) applyprior and
future sweat equity to the development ofthe Property. (Id. at § 84.) They make similar
allegationsin their promissoryestoppel claim. (Id. at { 103.) As concerns(ii), JIH’s opportunity
to purchase the Property was accomplished by a separate assignment contract with NRM that was
executed on February 11, 2015, almost one month beforethe effective dates ofthe JIH Agreement
and JM Agreement. NRM is not a party to this case, andit received $300,000 in separate
considerationforits assignment contract. The Court does not find any fraud, misrepresentation,
or estoppelclaimsrelated to the assignment contract to be properly before this Court.
i. Fraud-Related Counterclaims
Counterclaimantsassert claims for fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation,
and conspiracy to commit fraud.° An essential element a party asserting any misrepresentation
claim must demonstrateis its reasonable reliance onthe information they claimto be false. Hicks
y. Sumter Bank & Trust Co., 269 Ga. App. 524, 527 (2004) (“Relianceis an essential element of
both fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and that reliance must be justified.”).
Counterclaimants have failed to demonstrate any disputed issue of fact exists regarding this
essential elementoftheir three fraud and misrepresentation counterclaims.
° Georgia does not recognize an independent causeof action for conspiracy. Dyer v. Honea, 252 Ga. App. 735,
738 (2001) (“[t]he cause of actionfor civil conspiracylies not in the conspiracyitself, but in the underlying tort
committed against the [claimant] and the resulting damage.”)
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In Raysoni v. Payless Auto Deals, LLC, 296 Ga. 156, 157 (2014), the Georgia Supreme
Court stated,
when one has entered a contract with a binding and comprehensive mergerclause, any
reliance upon precontractual representations is, generally speaking, unreasonable as a
matter of law. Likewise, whenone is bound by a contract that includes termsthat expressly,
conspicuously, unambiguously, and squarely contradict precontractual representations, any
reliance uponthose precontractual representations may be deemed unreasonable as a matter
of law. (Citations omitted.)
Here, the JM Agreement contains a merger clause. It unequivocally provides, “all prior
negotiations among the parties . . . are merged in this [JM] Agreement and there are no other
promises, agreements, conditions, undertakings, warranties or representations, oral or written,
express or implied, between them with respect to the transaction contemplated herein.” (JM
Agreement, § 14.21.) Moreover, as established above, the “precontractual” representations that
form the basis of the fraud and misrepresentation claims unambiguously contradict the written
terms of the JM Agreement.
Counterclaimants suggest the merger clause became operative on the March 10, 2015
effective date of the JM Agreementand not whenthe contract was signedjust prior to the March
31, 2015 closing, such that it would not foreclose them from relying on any misrepresentations
madewhile the parties were negotiatingtheirinitial contributions throughout much of March 2015.
(Def. Am. Resp. to Pla. MSJ, n. 9.) The Court disagrees with this interpretation. The language of
the mergerclause itself contemplates that all prior agreements and promises have been merged
into the written agreement suchthat it would preclude reliance on any misrepresentations that
occurred prior to its execution. Regardless, even if the merger clause took effect on March 10,
2015, the JM Agreement requires any amendmentbe madein writing and signed byall members,
thus Jubilee Development and Minchew Enterprises could not reasonably rely on any oral
representation about their required initial capital contributions made after March 10, 2015. (JM
Agreement, § 14.14.)
ii. Promissory Estoppel Counterclaim
Plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the promissory estoppel counterclaim, asserting
 promissory estoppel does not lie where a written contract exists, and Counterclaimants responded
that this claim wasa permissible alternate theory of recovery. See 0.C.G.A.§ 9-1 1-8(e)(2); Baker
vy. GOS] Enterprises, Ltd., 351 Ga. App. 484 (2019) (promissory estoppelis alternate theory of
recovery to breach ofcontract). The Court rejects Counterclaimants’ position. “When neither
side disputes the existence of a valid contract, the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply,
even whenit is asserted in the alternative.” Am. Casual Dining, L.P. v. Moe's Sw.Grill. LLCs
426 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2006); see also Bouboulis v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 860 F.
 
Supp. 2d 1364, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (“Georgia lawbars a claim for promissory estoppel in the
face of an enforceable contract.”) Here, Counterclaimants donot dispute the enforceability ofthe
JM and JIH Agreements. In the preliminary statement accompanyingtheir counterclaims, they
noted some counts “may be subject to agreementsto arbitrate entered into betweenthese parties .
..” (Am. Answerand Counterclaims,filed October 31, 2018, p. 2.) Subsequently, as the parties
have informed the Court, certain counterclaims are now being arbitrated underthe provisions of
the JIH Agreement. Having acknowledged the enforceability of the operating agreements at the
heart ofthis transaction, Counterclaimants are foreclosed from pursuing this alternate theory of
recovery.
In their response brief, Counterclaimants appear to expand ontheiroriginal promissory
estoppel claim, arguing they relied on “post-Operating Agreement promises” by continuing
development and managementactivityefforts on the Property so as to earn fees for JMthat would
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offset their capital contributions. (Def. Am. Resp.to Pl. MSJ, p. 30.) Gryderv. Conley, 352 Ga.
App. 891 898 (2019) outlines the essential elements of a promissory estoppel claim.
(1) the defendant made a promise or promises; (2) the defendant should have reasonably
expected the plaintiffs to rely on such promise;(3) the plaintiffs relied on such promise to
their detriment; and (4) an injustice can only be avoided by the enforcementofthe promise,
because as a result ofthe reliance, plaintiffs changed theirpositionto their detriment by
surrendering, forgoing, or rendering a valuable right.
Asto the final element, the development and managementactivities performed for JIH on behalf
of JM were contemplated as part of the developmentdeal and associated contracts. Accordingly,
the Court cannotdiscernthat Jubilee Development or MinchewEnterprises changedtheirpositions
in reliance on any promise made by Plaintiffs after entering into the JM Agreementand the JIH
Agreement.
5. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing,it is hereby ORDEREDthat Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment be DENIEDasto Plaintiffs’ Count I for Declaratory Relief and CountII for Breach of
Contract and that it be GRANTEDas to Counterclaimants’ CountIII for Fraud in the Inducement,
Count IV for Negligent Misrepresentation, Count V for Conspiracy to Commit
Fraud/Misrepresentation, and Count VI for Promissory Estoppel.
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